Introduction
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium
that may otherwise not be possible. We study this is the Asynchronous setting.
Abstract
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium
that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players
to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only
cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play communication. Previous
work has considered this problem in a synchronous setting. Here we
consider the effect of asynchrony on the problem, and provide upper
bounds for implementing mediators. Considering asynchronous
environments introduces new subtleties, including exactly what
solution concept is most appropriate and determining what move
is played if the cheap talk goes on forever. Different results are
obtained depending on whether the move after such “infinite play”
is under the control of the players or part of the description of the
game.